When I grew up, I was told there was `a right way, a wrong way, and the Army way.' The `Standard Operating Procedures' for the United States Army often had little connection with the world. In World War II, US soldiers invented the words `SNAFU' and `FUBAR' to explain this. In the language I learned as the child, the words were pronounceable acronyms for `Situation Normal, All Fouled Up' and `Fouled Up Beyond All Relief'.
So it is with considerable bemusement that I read a paper by Colonel Paul F. Dicker, United States Army Reserve, that based much of his analysis on works from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Warfighting Center, and Department of the Army. who are the source for `standard operating procedures'
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff define
... four phases of a Joint Campaign as (1) deter/engage, (2) seize initiative, (3) decisive operations, and (4) transition.
The period after the `fall of Bagdad' marked the beginning of phase 4.
Colonel Dicker summarized his paper by saying this:
SUMMARY: U.S. strategy after armed conflict in Iraq was to seal the victory through re-establishment of infrastructure and establishment of democratic civil bodies of government. .... These requirements were not accomplished. ....
He also said
Prior to the invasion by coalition forces, there were numerous studies that identified specific areas that must be considered to succeed ...
Since I have heard people say that only anti-Americans talked about phase 4 before the US invasion of Iraq, I should note that one of the studies came from the Marine Warfighting Laboratory. The United States Marines are not known as an anti-American organization.
Dicker ended by making twelve recomendations. It is worth looking at each of these, since they tell us the failures that occurred:
Put another way, the United States did not implement `phase 4' actions as its enemy was defeated.
The US Army Field Manual, one source of `standard operating procedures', says that ... the composition of a post-hostilities force may be substantially different from that needed for combat operations.
Otherwise, order and law vanish and the necessary conditions for victory also vanish.
Otherwise, the old government, the one we are trying to defeat, looks better in hind sight.
When this is not done, we lose.
Colonel Dicker says that an example of this
... was demonstrated in Bosnia, after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. After the war ended in Bosnia, the media was closely monitored.... The monitoring action prevented the spread of rumors, propaganda, and other information designed to stir emotions against the peace process. This aided in the acceptance of the peace plan and reduced threat to the military peacekeepers.
Dicker goes on to say
Controls similar to this should have been implemented to neutralize the rumors and conspiracy theories that threatened the progress in Iraq.
This is because US forces lacked the money or the training to kick-start the economy. As Dicker says
... Almost immediately after major fighting ceased in Umm Qasr, British soldiers had funds available and began to hire local workers to be cooks, kitchen helpers, drivers to haul water, and workers for trash pickup. However, U.S. units did not have funds to accomplish these needed tasks until the second week of May 2003.
Consider a single issue: much of the Iraqi economy depends on electricity, yet electrical generation and transmission systems were left broken.
This may seem like a trivial point, but without such an alignment, the US found itself with coordination problems, distrust, and poor working rapport between the military and civil authorities.
When you do not know how to follow up, you lose.
As Dicker says
.... Even with the clear indications of serious security problem, no additional preventive action was taken. On the day Kirkuk fell, valuable equipment and spare parts were stolen while US forces waited outside the city.
Otherwise, to reverse an old saying, we
... snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
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