Persuasion, Legitimacy, and Power

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Copyright © 2004 Robert J. Chassell

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Persuasion, Legitimacy, and Power

In The Goal was Victory, I talked about the United States war against terrorism:

If Americans do not feel safer in October 2041 than they did in October 2001, the war was lost.

But there is more to victory than safety.

Safety is only the first of the four requirements for a government to be civilized. Victory must encompass more than the defeat of terrorism.

Victory must include justice as well as safety. Moreover, in a rapidly changing world, for justice, victory requires democracy. Otherwise, the wrong people stay in power and the country does not adapt to changes. (Of course, there is no telling that a democratic government will act well — democracy is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition.)

In Persuading Those Not Sure, I quoted Doug Pensinger, who wrote,

... Terrorism and the war against it are ... about convincing those people that aren't sure who to believe who is right.

The key is persuasion; without persuasion, a government lacks legitimacy. A government may use violence or bribery to rule, but no one follows its wishes because they perceive them as correct. They follow the government because they are bribed or afraid. As a practical matter, since people dislike such a government, democracy is impossible.

In the short run, persuasion may be impossible. Certainly, in the current US effort against terrorism, persuasion is impossible. Past US policy towards Muslim countries has failed.

This is, I think, why the US has recently followed a strategy of intimidation, in the Middle East .

Although the short run may last a long time — the Roman Empire took centuries to fall — the short run does not last forever. And in the modern world, events that may have taken centuries in the past can work themselves out in decades or years.

Consequently, the US needs to adopt a persuasive long run strategy.

On 15 June 2004, Michael A. Weinstein wrote of structural weaknesses. The United States occupation of Iraq

... has revealed that the United States lacks the capacity to neutralize insurgent movements, run prisons effectively, procure actionable intelligence and conduct successful public relations. Most important, it has proved unable to provide the basic function of government: personal security in the forms of public safety and basic services.

Weinstein also says,

... the US military is underforced for any major project of nation-building in absolute numbers and, more important, in the distribution of specialties.

But for the US to gain victory in the long run, it must persuade people who live in foreign countries to condemn those in their countries who will act against the US. In order to do this, the US must bring legitimate government to the whole world.

Some will say that the US must start with itself. It is certainly true that at the time of writing, June 2004, the United States is going through a period of crisis.

In addition to the kinds of problems that Weinstein mentioned, because one of its four major political traditions is currently so dominant, the United States may find it hard to adopt a successful long term strategy of persuasion.

The current short term strategy of intimidation fits what Walter Russell Mead calls the `Jacksonian Tradition' in US politics.

Many Americans doubt the practicality of polices that come from the other three traditions.

Meade talks about ... the commercial realism of the Hamiltonians. In the middle 1990s, members of the Clinton Administration feared that China would be dangerous to the US so long as it remained `middling rich'. But, they figured that when enough Chinese became prosperous, these people would act to prevent their government from endangering their comforts. Consequently, US policy tried to encourage Chinese economic growth, so China would pass through its `danger period' as quickly as possible.

However, people in the `Jacksonian Tradition' fear that a richer enemy is more dangerous.

Meade also speaks of ... the crusading moralism of Wilsonian transcendentalists.

It goes without saying that many consider moralism impractical. They figure there will always be bad people in the world. They doubt that anyone can create institutions that will successfully deal with evil. They figure the Founders failed when they created the United States government.

According to Meade, the fourth political tradition is the ... the supple pacifism of the principled but slippery Jeffersonians .... To deal with the uncooperative, this requires `actions less than war', such as the 1990s trade embargo against Iraq.

People who favor intimidation argue that such actions fail.

Nonetheless, intimidation fails in the long run. Even the Roman Empire fell. Power comes only from legitimacy, and legitimacy comes only from persuasion.

Thus, the United States must adopt a long term policy that others will accept.

Philip Bobbitt1 argues that during the next century legitimacy will come to governments that provide opportunity. This is a move beyond the previous century, during which countries,

... all took their legitimacy from the promise to better the material welfare of their citizens.

But in the new century, people will no longer accept poverty from accidents of birth extrinsic to a person, such as their parent's wealth, race, or religion.

A government that helps people find a way to do better than before will gain legitimacy. Meritocracy will move forward.

However, meritocracy also means that some will win and some will lose.

... there will be many who perceive themselves and are perceived by others as losers. They will have made a mistake when they were 16, or an `Act of God' will befall them, or they will fail at any job valued by a market society.

Consequently, a government must also support compassion, since enough successful people will think `there but for the grace of God go I'. And since people fear that losers will try to steal, justice will become more important.

So the policy should favor opportunity, compassion, and justice. Fortunately, even with different national styles for opportunity, everyone will accept the basic ideas.


Footnotes

[1] The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History,
Philip Bobbitt,
Random House, Knopf edition, 2002: ISBN 0-375-41292-1,
Random House, Anchor Books edition, 2003: ISBN 0-385-72138-2