In an essay by Stirling Newberry on the `energy state', he considers Philip Bobbitt's 1 terms for the different kinds of countries or nations over the past half-thousand years and the next half-century or century. Newberry suggests different terms and that Bobbitt's expectation is wrong: not that we are entering a period when a `market' state will become predominant, but that such a state developed more than a century ago. Nowadays, Newberry argues we in the rich countries are living in states in which energy and information are critical.
I do not disagree with the idea that energy and information are critical and have been since before World War II. But I disagree with Newberry's description of the North of the United States, during its civil war (1861 – 1865), as developing into a market state. Yes, there were many markets, but more importantly, it was developing into an industrial state.
The reason is straightforward: according to Alfred D Chandler Jr ( Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism), in the United States, the great industrial operations that developed were corporate oligopolies. In Germany, they were bank-coordinated monopolies, and in Britain, they were non-competitive associations. In no instance were they competitive market entities as described by the classical economists. Indeed, in the 1930s, Coase developed the idea of an American corporation as an entity that allocated resources in a bureaucratic fashion because the market did not provide the requisite information.
Moreover, the former Soviet Union was not a `market' state; it was what many describe as a `state capitalist' economy. It called itself a `centrally planned' economy.
As Newberry says correctly, nationalism lost power during World War I. After that war, the major states became `Industrial-Nationalist' and then, by the beginning of Word War II, `Industrial-Energy'. Just as political deference to royalty and religion continued, so did political deference to nationalism. But countries' governing elites were concerned with their industrial development and their energy sources. They became, fundamentally, `Industrial-Energy' states.
As very large scale sources of concentrated energy became more and more important, the `Industrial-Energy' state became the `Energy-Industrial' state: put another way, access to energy become more and more a concern. More precisely, they became `Fossil_Fuel-Industrial' states, since they depended on fossil fuels.
(Incidentally, the United States currently consumes 3.29 terawatts, an amount that many people do not conceive. They think erroneously that a million windmills, each producing as much energy as a fast moving car, would be enough.)
As old-time industry, like steel production, loses salience to industries based on `information', it becomes reasonable to say that an `Energy-Industrial' state is being or will be replaced by an `Energy-Information' economy.
But to be a state, an `Energy-Information' economy must also gain political legitimacy. It must do more than ensure supplies of energy. The provision of energy, like the provision of order, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a country.
This is where Philip Bobbitt is correct: as he points out, one of the two stools on which a state stands is legitimacy. (The other stool is its power to wage war.)
In particular, a state must either do without revenue, gain it inefficiently with a large policing force, or provide a reason for its people to pay taxes without them being too costly. The later is what a state gains by legitimacy: inexpensive revenue.
Bobbitt's argument is that in the richer countries, legitimacy now comes from the provision of opportunity. People will not pay taxes for an hereditary elite, whether royal or rich; nor will they pay taxes to invade their neighbors. But they will pay taxes for a government that gives everyone a chance or two.
People no longer think it is fair that someone born a serf should always be a serf. They figure that a smart fellow — or gal — should have the right to `get ahead'.
But that is not all. Many will fail. They will perceive themselves and be perceived by others as losers. They will have made a mistake when they were 16, or an `Act of God' will befall them, or they will fail at any job valued by a market society.
This means that compassion will become important politically, since enough successful people will think `there but for the grace of God go I'.
Moreover, since people dislike free riders, and since new times mean new issues which do not fit into traditional categories, visible justice will become more important.
Thus, the new policies will involve `Opportunity, Compassion, and Justice'.
There are various parts to the creation of such a state. One is its form. The best way so far known for providing opportunity is one in which the government defends a competitive market — not an oligopolistic market or monopolies, but one in which in which individuals and groups have a chance to `get ahead'. Hence the importance of calling this a `market' state. Of course, a market state must be one in which a government regulates and guards the market. Otherwise, powerful groups take over and kill the market.
Second is its size. As Newberry says
This means that for an economy to become a legitimate state, it needs to be larger than any contemporary country.
While I do not think any contemporary major power envisages a new organization that would reduce its sovereignty, current countries are creating mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution among themselves, such as the World Trade Organization. However, these organizations lack legitimacy.
We need a new entity to provide legitimacy, but not one that major current states, like the US, will avoid.
As far as I can see, history is no good. That is the basis on which UN representation is based: one nation, one vote. The US gets the same vote as Angola. (In the US Senate, California gets the same vote as Wyoming.) Population is no good either, even though people like it. The US gets outvoted by India and China.
We need a three chamber legislature. Power in the third chamber should be based on actually paid taxes. This gives the rich countries overt power to offset history and population. Also, we need what are called in the US `states rights', that is, restrictions on the power of this `super-state' government from taking actions that individual states dislike.
A third issue is energy. As Newberry says so accurately:
Oil and natural gas will run out. Coal will last longer, but it, too, will run out. It looks to me that current US policy is to maintain its dominance in an energy economy based on oil and natural gas. This might work for a decade or two. But it cannot last forever. (This is one reason I think those who support the current US administration and who are also far-sighted plan to abandon the country in a generation or so. Why else support a `borrow and spend' administration that does not invest in bridges, parks, education, and research? Nothing but eventual abandonment makes sense.)
So we will need either to develop a not-too-expensive, alternative source of energy or keep people in China, India, Europe, the US, and elsewhere at home in an `information state' or both.
As far as I can see, we will reach an `Information-Energy' state only if energy becomes cheap and strategically insignificant. There are several research paths that could lead this way. This research should be supported. Otherwise, information will always be secondary to energy.
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