[
Written in June 2002
Update in August 2004
]
Many people have criticized the recent Bush Administration proposal [i.e., the 2002 `roadmap'] for Israel/Palestine peace as being unlikely to succeed.
They say that the US should not expect the Palestinians to
Using an athletic metaphor, they say that the `bar' established by the US government is `too high'.
But suppose this is the intent?
In this case, what happens?
The United States government reduces the time in spends on the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
The Bush administration may perceive this as an advantage.
For one, you can ask yourself, how many Arab Americans gave money to Republicans in 2000 or voted for them? How many Jewish Americans gave money to Republicans in 2000 or voted for them?
The Bush administration can ask itself, why should we bother to support people who have not helped us?
Second, the Bush administration is likely afraid of El Qaeda. Bear in mind, the Bush administration bases policy on the premise that punishment deters crime. Hence, if someone murders another, that person should be executed. Unfortunately for them, the suicide attackers of 2001 September 11 died during their attacks. Capital punishment failed as a deterrence. Deterrence failed.
This failure is contrary to the Bush administration world view. The solution has been to put the suicide attackers into a special category, namely that of `evil'. (Obviously, patriotic Americans who die to defend their country are also not accounted for by the punishment model; these people are put into a different special category, that of `heroic'.)
Third, the Bush administration may well believe that former President Clinton is as `slick', that is to say, as good at persuading people, as they, the Republicans, have claimed. They may figure that he is better than they. They may conclude that if he could not get the Palestinians and Israelis to come to terms, they will surely fail.
Fourth, the Bush administration may believe that significant powers among the Palestinians wish to continue the Palestinian/Israeli conflict for several generations, until the Palestinians become powerful enough to kill the Israelis. The argument by Hamas and others is that the Israelis do not deserve to live on Arab land; and that several generations of physical hardship for Palestinians means only that they should seek more comfort in religion.
Fifth, the Bush administration may well believe that Prime Minister Sharon of Israel has dropped the former Israeli policy of `trading land for peace' in favor of the policy he has advocated for two decades, namely `trading peace for peace'. If so, Israel will make Palestinian conditions more harsh. The Bush administration would be just as happy for its Democratic opponents to become identified with Jewish voters who support Israel.
[ Update in August 2004: in the two years since this was written, we have seen Israel establish a new policy, which is to separate itself from the Palistinians both by building a physical barrier and, it is planned, by pulling its military forces out of Gaza, at least. This new policy does not require cooperation with the Palestinians.
[ Among Israelis, the wall is popular. Military withdrawal is less popular. Commentators that I have read suggest that one consequence will be a civil war among the major groups within the Palestinian areas. Perhaps a dominant power will emerge. The Israeli government may come to believe that it can negotiate with such a power without other groups having a blocking power.
[ A second consequence, less frequently suggested, is that the Palestinians will become even more opposed to Israel than they are now. They will support foreign soldiers, increase the number of `over-the-wall' rocket attacks (doubtless, the Israelis' anti-missile program is intended as a counter), and fund further anti-Semitic propaganda and attacks in regions outside of the Middle East. ]
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