Possible structure for `Choice and Constraint' - 2

14 July 2004

In the first part of this essay, I outlined a possible structure for Choice and Constraint but left open some questions.

One question has to do with

... the concept of systems built with components that are `identical, always and everywhere' ....

My problem is that I refer to laws as being built from `unbreakable components', but people often break the law.

On second thoughts, it becomes clear that the distinction is between a law which in itself does not break and the person who violates the law. This contrasts with a person who drives a car whose engine dies. In the latter case, it is the car that is at fault, not the person. This is all so very simple, but I did not see how to express this.

More to the point, this offers an opportunity to bring in a Rappaport observation:

Rituals bring into being certain states of affairs. "When authorized persons declare peace in a proper manner, peace is declared whether or not the antagonists are persuaded" to comply. (p 189)
In addition, these states of affairs are judged according to criteria that are provided by rituals. If "a man is properly dubbed to a knighthood and then violates the code of chivalry, ... we do not say that the dubbing was faulty," but that the knight is faulty. The state of affairs created by a ritual is judged "by the degree to which it conforms to the stipulations of the ritual." (p 189)

Unlike cars or computers, laws are not expected to break, but some people to whom they apply will break them. Put another way, the onus is on the people, not the laws.

However, in times of change, a society needs a social mechanism to change laws rapidly and legitimately, just a society needs people to fix broken cars and computers. That brings us back to the need for a government that is perceived as providing of justice.


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